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One Case, Two Decisions: Khalid v. Bush, In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, and the Neutral
Decisionmaker
Daniel Freemant
Khalid v. Bush, 335 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C 2005).
"Non-Resident Aliens Captured and Detained Outside the United States Have No
Cognizable Constitutional Rights."1
Judge RichardJ. Leon
"[T]he Court interprets Rasul, in conjunction with other precedent, to require the
recognition that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay possess enforceable constitutional
rights."2
Judge Joyce Hens Green
These statements lie at the core of two recent decisions by judges of the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Each judge ruled on identical
motions to dismiss, supported and opposed by identical briefs, deciding
whether indefinite detention of alien enemy combatants at Guantdnamo Bay
was impermissible under a variety of legal theories ranging from executive
overreach to customary international law. On January 19, 2005, Judge Richard
Leon answered an unequivocal no, dismissing each of the petitioners claims.
Less than two weeks later, Judge Joyce Hens Green denied the motion to
dismiss, granting that the petitioners had cognizable rights under both the Fifth
Amendment and the Geneva Conventions and that the current system of
Combat Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) was insufficient to vindicate those
rights.
These cases thus provide a unique empirical demonstration of a core tenet
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1. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d. 311, 320 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-5063 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 2, 2005).
2. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal docketed,
No. 05-8003 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2005).
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of legal realism: the vacuity of the notion of judge as neutral decisionmaker. 3 In
this era of ideological judicial appointments, these cases provide concrete
evidence for efforts to temper the aggressive partisanship of the nomination
process. After first looking at the unique procedural circumstances that put the
same motion in front of two judges, this Comment explores how and why two
jurists struck starkly different legal conclusions when presented the same
arguments under the same binding precedents. A close analysis of each
decision's structural and rhetorical framework provides clues to its author's
normative preferences. With an absence of clear instruction from higher courts,
this Comment describes how each judge manipulated some precedents and
discarded others to fit their preference. Finally, the Comment places the
decision in the larger context of national security jurisprudence and the debate
over judicial nominations.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush held that federal courts
have jurisdiction under statute4 to hear petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
from detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantdnamo Bay.5 The Court's
decision in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, handed down on the same day, established
procedural guidelines for habeas petitions from outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any district court. 6 The third of the Court's triumvirate of enemy
combatant cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, stated that courts can and must adjudicate
conflicts between the military and asserted constitutional rights.7 A rush of
filings8 and transfers 9 followed, and by August 4, 2004, thirteen habeas
petitions, representing more than fifty detainees, rested in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.' 0 Each would be decided under the
same precedent, from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the
3. See William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 525
(2005). But see Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-84 (2002).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2243 (2000).
5. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
6. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 n.16 (2004)
7. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[I]t does not infringe on the
core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated
roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.").
8. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Khalid v. Bush (July 6, 2004) (D.D.C. 2004) (No.
04-1142).
9. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 2003).
10. See Motion for Joint Case Management Conference at 5-6, Rasul v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No.
02- 0299), Al Odah v. United States (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 02-0828), Habib v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No.
02-1130), Kurnaz v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1135), Khadr v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1136),
Begg v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1137), Benchellali v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1142), El-
Banna v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1144), Gherebi v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1164),
Boumediene v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1166), Anam v. Bush (04-1194), Almurbati v. Bush (04-
1227), Abdah v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1254).
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collegial deference within a district court.
In an effort to promote judicial efficiency, Judge Gladys Kessler of the
District Court's Calendar and Case Management Committee granted, in part,
the government's Motion for Joint Case Management, allowing Senior Judge
Joyce Hens Green to hear common issues of law, with the consent of each
original judge." In response, seven judges allowed Judge Green to adjudicate
the crucial motion to dismiss. Only one judge declined: Richard J. Leon, a
recent appointee to the court.' 2 Judges Green and Leon held back-to-back oral
arguments, in which attorneys argued the same motions' 3 in front of judges
with opposite attitudes; Judge Leon was skeptical toward the petitioners 14 while
Judge Green prodded the government's interpretation of the President's war
powers.15
II. STRUCTURE AND RHETORIC
The resulting decisions both open with the now-standard introduction to
national security cases: the paean to September 11.16 From there the structure
and language divert, giving their opposing outcomes each an air of justice and
inevitability.
Judge Leon's decision frames the result as upholding the President's
necessary and well-established powers. His principle technique is to establish a
tone of legality and formalism, hinting at the propriety of the detentions.' 7 He
also stresses that the petitioners are "foreign nationals . . . [without] any
connection to the United States, other than their current status as detainees at a
11. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (D.D.C. 2005). Both sides had
agreed, "[1]t was best to have one judge resolve all the cases." Neal A. Lewish, Judge Extends Legal
Rights for Guantnamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at 12.
12. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. at 451 n.14.
13. Compare Individual Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum, Khalid v.
Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 04-CV-1 142) with Individual Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C.
2005) (No. 02-0299).
14. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 326 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Although the petitioners assert
that their continued detention violates the Geneva Convention, they subsequently conceded at oral
argument that that Convention does not apply ....") (internal citations omitted); Lauren Ahwan,
Lawyers Expect Sympathetic Habeas Corpus Ruling for Hicks, AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec.
3, 2004.
15. See Carol Leonnig, Judge Questions Sweep of Bush's War on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
2004, at A4; Jonathan Turley, A Check on Wartime Powers, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7, 2005, at 26.
16. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 446; Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 314-15.
See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (invoking the September 11 attacks as a premise
to a decision concerning detainees); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (same).
17. See, e.g., Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.
L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) and Exec. Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001)); id. at 317-20 (describing
the extent of the President's war powers). Judge Leon dedicates nearly as much ink to describing the
President's war powers and the applicability of the Authorization for Use of Military Force as he does to
the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 320-23.
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U.S. military base,"'18 providing a preliminary foundation for the claim that the
United States owes the petitioners no rights, despite their multi-year detention.
Perhaps most glaring, however, are Judge Leon's rhetorical barbs, broadcasting
his view of the suit as entirely frivolous. After stating each party's position, he
frames the question presented as "the novel issue of whether there is any viable
legal theory under which a federal court could issue a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the legality of the detention of non-resident aliens captured abroad
and detained outside the territorial sovereignty of the United States, pursuant to
lawful military orders, during a Congressionally authorized conflict."'
' 9
In contrast, Judge Green rests her decision on the need to rectify the
fundamental injustice being perpetrated on Guantdnamo. She begins with a
discussion of the petitioners' seizure, framing the detentions as battlefield
captures, rather than the arrest and detention of terrorists, and referring to the
petitioners as "individuals" rather than "aliens." 20 She also uses the term
"enemy combatants" in quotation marks, shifting from a tone of neutrality to
21
one of open skepticism. She then discusses the judicial history of the Rasul
decision, stressing the Supreme Court's reversal of the lower court decisions in
order to highlight the continuing legal evolution. By beginning her discussion
in nineteenth-century jurisprudence, she describes an absolute rejection of
extraterritorial rights, even for citizens, that is plainly at odds with current law.
While discussing the applicability of the Fifth Amendment, Judge Green
chastises the government's claims of deference. "Of course, it would be far
easier for the government to prosecute the war on terrorism if it could imprison
all suspected 'enemy combatants' at Guantanamo Bay without having to
acknowledge and respect any constitutional rights of detainees. That, however,
is not the relevant legal test." 22 Most importantly, because Judge Green rules
that the detainees have rights under the Fifth Amendment, she is able to
dedicate several pages to the violations of those rights at Guantdnamo,
demonstrating the extent of unconstitutional conduct and establishing an air of
incredulity, if not indignation. 23 Facing such grave violations of procedural
18. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
19. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). Judge Leon also asserts that petitioners' argument "make[s] a
mockery of Congress's intent" and "presupposes that non-resident aliens ... enjoy [constitutional]
rights," id. at 320, and that "[i]t is not surprising that the petitioners have been unable to cite any case in
which a federal court has engaged in the substantive review and evaluation they seek of . . .the
military's decision to capture and detain a non-citizen as an enemy combatant." Id. at 328. Labeling
individuals who deny any belligerent act as enemy combatants had no historical precedent favoring
either party prior to September 11, 2001. See George C. Harris, Terrorism, War & Justice: The Concept
of the Unlawful Enemy Combatant, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 31, 37 (2003).
20. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
21. E.g., id. at 447. Judge Green also notes that the government did not define the term "as used by
the respondents" until July 7, 2004. Id. at 450.
22. Id. at 464.
23. Id at 465-78. Describing the CSRTs taking place on Guantinamo, she states, "[tihe laughter
reflected in the transcript is understandable, and this exchange might have been truly humorous had the
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norms, Judge Green appears justified ruling against the government in the
sensitive realm of national security.
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
The pivotal legal distinction between the two decisions is the applicability
of the Fifth Amendment to alien detainees captured outside the United States
and held on Guantdnamo. 24 The conditions of the detainees' detention-
indefinite incarceration, nearly incommunicado conditions, and a tribunal
without the rights of either a criminal trial or a tribunal under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice-would face a stiff challenge if applied to individuals
protected by the Fifth Amendment.25
Judge Leon answers the petitioners' challenge directly, titling the relevant
section, "Non-Resident Aliens Captured and Detained Outside the United
States Have No Cognizable Constitutional Rights."26 He bases this contention
on what he deems "the Supreme Court's unequivocal and repeated denial of
such rights to non-resident aliens.",27 Literally applying treaty language, Judge
Leon first asserts that Guantinamo remained "subject to the 'ultimate
sovereignty' of Cuba," 28 rather using the "plenary and exclusive jurisdiction"
framework stressed in Rasul.29 He then applies this "foreign territory"
categorization to the absolute statements in Johnson v. Eisentrager30 and
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,31 decisions denying all
constitutional protections to non-resident aliens. Recognizing the age of his
argument's foundation, he cites several modem cases to establish that he
continues to be bound to deny any and all constitutional rights to aliens outside
consequences of the detainee's 'enemy combatant' status not been so terribly serious and had the
detainee's criticism of the process not been so piercingly accurate." Id. at 470.
24. The two decisions also differ over the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention. Despite
the judges' conflicting general statements concerning the doctrine of self-execution, compare Khalid v.
Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 327 (D.D.C. 2005) with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases 355 F. Supp. 2d
443, 479 (D.D.C. 2005), their conclusions ultimately rest on a factual distinction. Both judges agreed
that individuals not affiliated with the Afghan army were not entitled to the protection of the
conventions, and none of the petitioners in Khalid could claim such affiliation. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d
at 326. The D.C. Circuit opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 126 S.
Ct. 622 (2005), found the Conventions non-self-executing, and the Supreme Court will hear the issue in
the January Term of 2006. See Charles Lane, High Court To Hear Case on War Powers, WASH. POST,
Nov. 8, 2005, at Al (noting oral argument scheduled for March 2006 and forecasting a July 2006
decision).
25. But see Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding arguably lesser conditions for
an American citizen captured by civil authorities in the United States).
26. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21.
27. Id.
28. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-
Cuba, Art. III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 426).
29. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004).
30. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
31. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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of U.S. territory. 32 Finally, he distinguishes Rasul as a purely statutory holding
and dismisses Justice Kennedy's statement in footnote fifteen that
"[p]etitioner's allegations . . . unquestionably describe custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"33 as dicta outside the
scope of the question presented.
Judge Leon reaches his decision by ignoring evolution in the doctrine.
While he quotes Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that "[n]either the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens," 34 he fails to recognize that
Rasul upheld the application of the federal habeas statute in "foreign territory"
with respect to non-citizens. Similarly, Judge Leon quotes the Supreme Court's
decisions in Zadvydas and Verdugo-Urquidez as modem affirmations of an
absolutist denial of rights for which they do not stand.35 Finally, Judge Leon's
narrow construction of Rasul reiterates portions of Justice Scalia's dissent; had
Rasul meant what Judge Leon interpreted it to mean, Justice Scalia would not
have needed to write much of his opinion. 36 With only one exception, each of
the decision's quotations from prior cases is a quote used by the Justice
Department in its motion to dismiss, 37 reflecting an unquestioning dedication to
one party's desired result, not just its argument.
Judge Green begins her discussion of constitutional applicability with a
deferential nod to the government's argument before stating her conclusion:
"[T]he Court interprets Rasul, in conjunction with other precedent, to require
the recognition that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay possess enforceable
32. See Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Jifryv. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2002); People's Mojahedin
Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999); and Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252
(D.C. Cir. 1960)).
33. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,483 n.15 (2004).
34. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318).
35. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, granted resident aliens greater rights than non-residents in removal
proceedings without defining away those lesser rights. Similarly, Verdugo-Urquidez limits the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment outside of the United States based on a textual interpretation that
does not apply to the Fifth Amendment. 494 U.S. at 265 ("[T]he people' protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community."). But see id. at 269 (reiterating the Eisentrager holding in dicta).
36. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's unheralded expansion of
federal-court jurisdiction is not even mitigated by a comforting assurance that the legion of ensuing
claims will be easily resolved on the merits.").
37. Compare Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 320-23 with Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support at 19-
22, 20 n.23, 25, Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 04-1142). But see Khalid, 355
F. Supp. 2d at 321 (quoting Eisentrager for the proposition that the key factor in determining the
government's obligation is "the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction," a quote not found in
the government's motion to dismiss).
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constitutional rights." 38 This statement lies at the end of a doctrinal evolution
beginning in the nineteenth century and reaching its peak in Rasul. She begins
with Ross v. McIntyre, the now-untenable pronouncement that even citizens
have no constitutional protections outside of sovereign American territory.39
Soon after, in the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court suggested that "the
Constitution prevented Congress from denying inhabitants of unincorporated
U.S. territories certain 'fundamental' rights, including . . . 'to due process of
law. ' 'Ao Judge Green then moves to D.C. Circuit precedent, finding that the
status of a "trust territory" discussed in Ralpho v. Bell, functional jurisdiction
without sovereignty, is analogous to the status of Guantinamo, requiring her to
41
uphold the petitioners' fundamental rights.
After describing the district and circuit court decisions made in Rasul on
the way to the Supreme Court, both of which highlighted Eisentrager's
rejection of habeas jurisdiction over non-citizens abroad,42 Judge Green turns to
the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul and its application of the habeas statute
to Guantdnamo. She describes that application as an indication that
GuantAnamo falls under Ralpho, "for all significant purposes, the equivalent of
sovereign U.S. territory. ' '43 Perhaps most importantly, Judge Green accepts the
petitioners' argument that footnote fifteen of Rasul indicates intent, if not an
explicit declaration, that the Justices "considered the petitioners to be within a
territory in which constitutional rights are guaranteed."
44
Judge Green too bends the law, coming to her absolute decision through
reliance on concurrences and plurality decisions that neither bind lower courts
nor overturn past precedent. Her use of Reid v. Covert, a plurality decision, to
overcome the Supreme Court's decision in Balzac v. Porto Rico limiting
"fundamental rights," allows her perception of a shift in the Court to overcome
a precedent that still binds the lower courts. Similarly, she uses Justice
Kennedy's narrow concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez to limit the majority's
38. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005).
39. 140U.S.453 (1891).
40. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 282 (1901)). Judge Green follows this jurisprudence through several more modem cases, noting
that allowable limitations on non-fundamental rights existed to leave in place local legal traditions and
facilitate justice, regardless of citizenship. Id. at 455-57 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
(plurality opinion); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); and Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138,
145 (1904)). This jurisprudence finds its most modem application in Justice Kennedy's concurrence to
Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("All would agree, for instance, that the
dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.").
41. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (citing Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607,
618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[T]here cannot exist under the American flag any governmental authority
untrammeled by the requirements of due process of law.") (internal citations omitted)).
42. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
43. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
44. Id. at 463.
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statement that Eisentrager "rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States .... 45
Judge Green's over-reliance on Rasul, a statutory decision, to address the
continued viability of Eisentrager's constitutional pronouncements leaves her
decision under-supported and vulnerable on appeal.
IV. FUTURE EFFECTS OF THE DECISIONS
Given the absolute pronouncements provided by these two decisions and
the litigation assault being waged on the system of detentions at Guantdnamo,
these decisions will continue to provide ammunition for government and public
interest litigators, who have already cited them for their conclusions of law.
The government's motion to dismiss in Rasul v. Rumsfeld cites Khalid for
absolute pronouncements and forthright language concerning the role of the
46
court and the self-execution of treaties. Similarly, the plaintiffs' memorandum
in opposition cites In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases extensively, particularly
for its interpretation of Rasul's footnote fifteen.
47
Of course, a definite pronouncement from the Supreme Court concerning
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment and the Geneva Conventions to
prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay would remedy the confusion created by these two
decisions. Even President Bush has stated that he expects the courts to dictate
48the procedures under which Guantdnamo detainees will be judged. Judge
Green stated in her opinion that "the Court would have welcomed a clearer
declaration in the Rasul opinion regarding the specific constitutional and other
substantive rights of the petitioners. ' 49 Perhaps the Supreme Court will provide
her with one in the next go-round.
These two decisions provide a startlingly clear demonstration of the effects
of the politicization of judicial nominations. 50 Prior to becoming a federal
judge, Judge Leon was hired by then-Congressman Dick Cheney as Deputy
45. Id. at 460 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269). Although Justice Kennedy filed a
separate concurrence, he also joined the majority opinion.
46. Individual Defendants' Motions to Dismiss at 10, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1864 (D.D.C.
filed Mar. 16, 2005) ("[T]he Court's role in reviewing the military's decisions to capture and detain a
non-resident alien is, and must be, highly circumscribed."); id at 20 ("The Supreme Court in Rasul
expressly limited its inquiry to whether non-resident aliens detained at Guantanamo have a right to
judicial review of the legality of their detention under the habeas statute .... "). See also id. at 6 n.6, 23
n.l 1 (citing Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005)).
47. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 30, No. 04-
1864, Rasul v. Bush (D.D.C. filed May 6, 2005) (citing In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp.
2d at 463); see also id. at 31, 33, 35 n.20 (citing In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443).
48. William Douglas, Bush Arrives in Scotland for G-8 Summit, Suffers Scrapes in Collision,
KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, July 7, 2005.
49. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
50. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Symposium, Reconsidering the Federal Judicial Appointments
Process: Merits vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 353 (2005).
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Counsel to the Republican Members of the House Select Iran-Contra
Committee. Leon subsequently served as lead counsel to the House
Republicans in a number of congressional investigations, including the 1992
"October Surprise" investigation of President Bush and the 1994 Whitewater
investigation of President Clinton.51 Although unquestionably a well-qualified
jurist,52 as a figure of confirmed partisanship, Judge Leon's decision not to cede
the motion to dismiss along with the rest of his colleagues to the much longer-
serving Judge Green provides concrete evidence for those who see President
Bush's nominations as overly political.53 While Judge Green's politically
neutral record prior to her appointment to the bench shields her from similar
criticism, her appointment by President Jimmy Carter in 1979 leads one to
presume that she has some liberal leanings.
54
Most importantly, these cases provide a clear demonstration that judges, the
so-called neutral, apolitical branch of the American system of government,
cannot be assumed to rise above their own proclivities to solve legal
conundrums in the manner of mathematical equations. Rather, jurists' attitudes,
as revealed by the structural and rhetorical choices throughout their decisions,
provide clues as to their real preferences, which they then support with the tool
at hand: the law. Acknowledging this limitation on the impartiality of the
judiciary, leaders should directly consider methods to temper the nomination of
divisive and political figures, be it through use of the Senate filibuster 5 or
through institutional innovations such as bipartisan nominating commissions or
merit selection commissions 56 enforced on the executive through an aggressive
use of the Advice and Consent clause.
57
51. Richard J. Leon, Congressional Investigations: Are Partisan Politics Undermining Our Vital
Institutions?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 825, 825-26 (1998).
52. Judge Leon was given a unanimous "Well Qualified" rating by the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary upon his nomination to the District Court for the District of
Columbia. Am. Bar Ass'n, Ratings of Article III Judicial Nominees: 107th Congress,
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings 107.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
53. See Jim Fisher, Bush-League Hearings-No Lawyers or Evidence, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB.
(Idaho), Feb. 5, 2005, at 10A (explicitly tying Judge Leon's decision to the Senate debate over judicial
confirmations).
54. See Senior Judge Joyce Hens Green, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/joyce-green-bio.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2005).
55. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominations, 26
CARDOZO L. REv. 331 (2005).
56. See Judith Resnik, Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 585 nn.4-5
(2005) (describing alternative nomination mechanisms).
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.

